The recent divisions between the Liberal Party and the Nationals, which seem to have culminated in the Nationals ending the coalition this morning, have made me think of the long history of the smaller conservative coalition partner exercising it’s influence over the larger party’s leadership.
While the focus has been on a particular piece of legislation, there are much deeper implications for Sussan Ley’s leadership. With the Liberal Party deeply divided, part of the issue on this legislation seems to have been Ley’s avoidance of calling a joint party room meeting where it is likely that her opponents would have had a majority. While the Nationals and Liberals have deeper issues that may justify a split in the Coalition, right now this also looks like something specific to the current leadership. Effectively the Nationals are vetoing this current Liberal leader. Littleproud’s statement ending the Coalition is quite personally directed at the current Liberal leader.
While only Liberal MPs have a vote in electing Liberal leaders, there is a long history of the Country Party (the former name for the Nationals) exercising a veto over Liberal leaders, particularly when in government. The big difference today is that the parties are no longer in government, and are not under an obligation to stay together, but I suspect the long relationship between the parties means the Nationals are right now demonstrating the power they have over the Liberal leadership.
The first example is probably the most famous. The Country Party coalesced from a number of state-based farmers groups, forming into a national party in 1920. At the 1922 election, the Nationalist government, led by Billy Hughes, lost it’s majority. The Country Party had never been in government before, and there was no default assumption that they would go into Coalition with the Nationalists (effectively the precursors of today’s Liberal Party).
Country Party leader Earle Page made a commitment to not support any government containing Hughes. This was a controversial position, with arguments made that it was up to the Nationalists to choose their own leader. But Hughes had his own internal opponents, and it was argued that his position was untenable. While the Nationalist party room rejected the Country Party’s demand initially, it continued negotiations until the Country Party insisted on his resignation before negotiating further. Eventually Hughes resigned.
Hughes was succeeded by his treasurer Stanley Bruce, who governed in Coalition with Page’s Country Party for the next seven years.
Page again played a key role when the United Australia Party prime minister Joseph Lyons died in early 1939. Page was sworn in as prime minister while the UAP determined what it would do next.
Robert Menzies was the front runner for the UAP leadership. Prior to Lyons’ death, he had been sending signals critical of his party’s leadership, signs that could have been a foreshadowing of a potential leadership challenge – they reminded me of Paul Keating’s conflict with Bob Hawke.
Page strongly disliked Robert Menzies, and did look into the possibility of making his stop-gap ministry permanent. Eventually the UAP elected Menzies as their new leader, narrowly defeating Billy Hughes. In response the Country Party withdrew from the coalition, with Menzies leading a minority government. When Page announced the resignation of his ministry in parliament, he unleashed a personal attack on Menzies. This attack undermined his position within the Country Party, and he soon lost the party leadership to Archie Cameron.
Menzies’ first prime ministership was short-lived, and he was eventually replaced by a government led by the Country Party’s Arthur Fadden.
The Country Party again exercised a leadership veto following the death of another prime minister. When Harold Holt disappeared in December 1967, Country Party leader John McEwen took office as prime minister. McEwen publicly stated that his party would not serve under William McMahon, the Liberal deputy leader. Eventually McMahon decided to not stand for the leadership, and Senate leader John Gorton was elected to the leadership.
McEwen withdrew his veto of McMahon following the 1969 election, and in 1971 a tied party room vote led to Gorton’s resignation and McMahon’s election as leader.
All three of these cases took place when the party was in government, but when the party’s leadership was not held by a strong figure. A threat to not support a government is more powerful.
When in opposition, there is less importance in being in Coalition. It can be important in terms of presenting a united front, but there is no reason that the two parties can’t exist separately in the short term. In more recent years, the provision of extra funds for the opposition frontbench increases the cost for the Nationals in leaving the coalition, but it is still much less than it would be if they were in government.
Out of government, there is also the example of the Joh for PM campaign in 1987, when the Queensland National Party first left the Coalition and then effectively forcing the rest of the party to also leave. This campaign did not result in a change in Liberal leadership, but it arguably damaged John Howard’s 1987 campaign, and he lost the leadership in 1989 without facing another election.
If Sussan Ley ends up losing her party’s leadership, a big part of that story will be about how the Nationals have made it hard for her. While it is likely that she has also lost majority support in her own party room, the inclusion of Nationals members makes her position substantially weaker. While the parties could choose to exist separately without a Coalition for now, it seems unlikely that a Liberal leader will be able to succeed without a good relationship with the Nationals.
The modern Nationals are in a peculiar position, where they hold their seats by very safe majorities against Labor and are competitive in very few marginal Labor seats. A moderating position may help the Liberals in the cities but it won’t do much for the Nationals. On the other hand, they are first in line to be hit by a surging One Nation vote. These diverging interests will be hard to reconcile, and history shows us that this reconciliation will be crucial to future success.